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Abstract This paper investigates the patterns of bargaining in multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) in the presence of labor unions coordination activities. It derives the
bargaining regimes which arise as sub-game perfect equilibria, and considers both
simultaneous and sequential games where parties choose whether to coordinate wage
negotiations across subsidiaries. It shows that unions’ per member transaction costs
may attenuate the conflict of interests between bargaining parties as regards the cen-
tralization level at which negotiations should take place.
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1 Introduction
Bargaining between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and organized workforce is a
subject of key relevance in modern economics. This issue, for instance, takes central
position in the European Union (EU) context, where the presence of MNEs char-
acterizes several industries. Furthermore, over 55 % of the added value generated
by foreign capital-controlled enterprises comes from other EU Member States enter-
prises, usually with the affiliates which are active in neighboring countries European
Commission (2010). Both the international dimension of MNEs and the EU initia-
tives such as the institution of the European Works Council (EWC) as well as the
practice of opting out from national/sector collective bargaining in favor of company-
wide agreements European Foundation (2009) have a substantial impact on labor
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market outcomes. This framework has caught labor unions’ attention since it could
offer the prospect of arranging transnational agreements at company level. Indeed,
the figures related to the cross-border company agreements among unions have been
increasing. According to the European Trade Union Confederation ETUC (2008),
the number of these agreements rose from 92 in 2005 to 147 in 2007, two-thirds of
which regarded European MNEs operating within the EU. However, as per the EWC
database of the European Trade Union Institute ETUI (2011), these figures relate to a
small subset of the MNEs in the EU, approximately one-sixth of those where the EWC
is active.
Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) suggest that firms would take strategic advantage
of the MNE organizational structure to preclude the formation of encompassing
company unions. However, unions may coordinate activities across boundaries to
improve their bargaining positions. Under which conditions is coordination advanta-
geous for unions? Why do unions have different attitudes as regards negotiations in
MNEs? Could the possibility of unions’ coordination influence the decision about
the organization of the wage bargaining in a MNE? This work focuses on these
issues.
It is crucial to answer the above questions to shed light on recent developments in
transnational labor unions’ practices; these developments can lead to the effective coor-
dination of the agendas and outcomes among cross-borders independent negotiations.
Workers’ representatives have started exploiting the EWC’s potential to coordinate
bargaining across plants and to set the background for negotiations in MNEs (Euro-
pean Commission 2009). In the banking sector, Danish trade unions have the mandate
to negotiate on behalf of all employees of the Danske Bank (EIROnline 2009). Fur-
thermore, the European Metalworking’s Federation (EMF), UNI Europa Graphical
(UEG), and the European Public Service Union (EPSU), three cross-border industry-
level federations, devised a procedure to receive the mandate to represent the workers’
side throughout company-wide transnational agreements. Since its formulation, the
EMF has utilized this internal procedure with five MNEs (Areva, Schneider, Daimler-
Chrysler, John Deere and ArcelorMittal) (European Foundation 2009; Gennard 2009)
while the EPSU has used it with Suez-Lyonnais des Eaux (Papadakis 2010). Finally,
transnational campaigns to support wage bargaining, either in targeted industries or
MNEs, are additional means labor unions use to move nearer to issues at the core
of traditional collective bargaining at international level. The main objective of these
unions’ campaigns is to gain better access to (and share of) essential information con-
cerning, for instance, total labor costs and their share in the companies’ total costs
as well company profitability, which may be useful in negotiation rounds (Keune and
Schmidt 2009).
The main results of the paper are as follows. When faced with unions’ coordination
costs, the wage bargaining structure in a MNE that produces homogeneous goods is
sensitive to the size of these costs and the relative bargaining power of the parties. The
coordinated/decentralized choice of the MNE affects the bargaining pattern due to the
effects on union rents. Partial coordination and full decentralization of wage negotia-
tions can emerge as equilibrium regimes. Thus, coordination is not always beneficial
for the bargaining parties. High transaction costs can more than offset unions’ coordi-
nation gains; headquarters agents can make excessive wage offers to the MNE. These
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effects partly attenuate the conflict of interests among the bargaining parties about the
level of centralization the company-wide wage negotiations should be conducted.
There is a consistent strand in literature which focuses on various facets of col-
lective bargaining. Authors such as Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988b),
Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2002), and Santoni (2009), examine the outcomes of dif-
ferent wage bargaining structures in oligopoly industries.1 Davidson (1988) considers
a simultaneous bargaining framework in a duopoly with homogeneous final goods.
Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b) extend the analysis to the strategic implications which
arise from product differentiation in a model where unions and firms are cast in bilat-
eral monopoly relations. The equilibrium bargaining structures crucially depend on
the nature of products. If unions may firstly choose the organization of bargaining,
in the presence of complement (substitute) goods, independent (coordinated) negoti-
ations with firms arise as equilibrium. Then, given the unions’ choice, if firms also
centralize bargaining, their preference order reverses: unions and firms have a conflict
of interest about the negotiation structures. Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2002) likewise
develop a model where multiunit firms and unions can choose their wage bargaining
structures. If workers organize plant level unions and goods are substitutes (comple-
ments), firms centralize (decentralize) negotiations. Conversely, if workers organize
a company level union, the firms are indifferent about the bargaining structure. On
the other hand, if the firms’ organizational structure is given, workers set up plant
(company) unions if goods are substitutes (complements).2 Santoni (2009) studies the
impact of international market integration on the choice whether to centralize nego-
tiations in the presence of fixed transaction costs for both bargaining parties. If the
goods are substitutes (complements), decentralization is a dominant strategy for firms
(unions). Hence, either full decentralization or partial centralization arises: the bar-
gaining regimes in equilibrium depend on the characteristics of the product market
integration process (one/two-way trade between countries).
While these contributions analyze negotiations in national oligopolies, the top-
ics of the collective bargaining structure in MNEs and its transnational dimension
are barely explored. Wage formation at company level in the context of an interna-
tional productive structure is the subject of Borghijs and Du Caju (1999). They analyze
unions’ cross-border cooperation vs. plant-specific wage settings within a single MNE
producing homogeneous goods in an integrated product market. To coordinate wage
bargaining, monopoly unions pay exogenous, symmetric, per member transaction
costs. Whether wage coordination is beneficial for unions depends on the size of these
costs: up to a threshold value, unions are better off with independent negotiations.
Recently, Eckel and Egger (2012) also investigated whether unions can improve their
1 Another strand of the literature investigates the case of sequential wage bargaining in oligopoly industries.
On this subject see, e.g., De Fraja (1993), Dobson (1994) and Banerji (2002).
2 Petrakis and Vlassis (2004) consider the endogenous formation of wage bargaining institutions in an
oligopoly with homogeneous products and asymmetries in firms’ efficiency and bargaining power. They
analyze the role of a national regulator establishing a minimum wage floor. This intervention leads, in
equilibrium, to different degrees of coordination: full centralization, partial centralization and full decen-
tralization. In contrast, this work finds that different degrees of bargaining coordination arise as sub-game
perfect equilibria, despite the absence of asymmetries in the plant efficiency and perfect substitutability
among workers in production.
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bargaining position in company-level negotiations by cooperating internationally. In
a two-country model, a monopolist MNE, producing homogeneous goods, negoti-
ates with local (plant-level) unions over wages and employment (efficient bargaining
model). The authors show that cooperation for unions is beneficial if their preferences
over wages and employment are similar across countries. Otherwise, the MNE’s threat
of relocations makes one union better off and the other worse off; these distributional
effects can hamper cooperation.
The present work also focuses on bargaining at the company level. The sub-
game perfect equilibria bargaining regimes are determined through a sequential game
between a MNE and plant-level unions. The paper analyzes a different sequence of
moves and number of stages of the game. In the present work, both bargaining par-
ties select their coordination strategy in the first stages. This differs from Horn and
Wolinsky (1988b) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2002), where each agent chooses
the organization of wage negotiations taking as given the bargaining structure of the
other agent. Two cases are considered: (1) players decide simultaneously and; (2) the
MNE acts as the first mover. Despite different specifications of the first stages, the last
two stages of the game are equal. Wage bargaining occurs simultaneously but inde-
pendently at each production site; then, given the negotiated wages, the MNE allocates
the production of goods among its plants. The order of moves matters: the first-mover
advantage of the MNE affects the equilibrium bargaining regime. As in Bárcena-Ruiz
and Garzón (2002), this paper also finds that, in the presence of homogeneous goods,
partial (unions’ or MNE plants’) coordination emerges as the organizational form of
the wage bargaining. However, in contrast to those authors, where full coordination
arises in equilibrium while full decentralization does not, this paper gets the opposite
result due to the presence of the unions’ transaction costs.
As in Borghijs and Du Caju (1999) the model considers a single firm with plants in
two countries of an integrated product market: this specification reflects in an appro-
priate way the reality of many well-integrated industries in the EU. However, it extends
the model of those authors in several ways. Firstly, by relaxing the monopoly union
assumption, this paper provides a general bargaining framework which allows for
a wider set of negotiation structures. Then, retaining the idea that coordination is
costly for unions, it investigates the bargaining regimes which arise as sub-game per-
fect equilibria. Unions coordinate bargaining activities by paying some per member
fees. Looking at the European context, where (national) unions at plant level delegate
European industry-wide unions, such as the EMF and EPSU, to represent workers
throughout company-wide negotiations in MNEs, this is the unions’ way to finance
coordination activities.3 As in Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), this work analyzes the
effects of labor market integration (a reduction in coordination costs) on the bargain-
ing regimes arising at company level. Communication technologies have been used in
recent years as a tool to structure a permanent information exchange and consultation
process. An example is the EMF-EMCEF-ETUF-TCL’s Eucob@n virtual network,
which provides a collection of data on collective bargaining for their affiliates. These
technologies are likely to decrease unions’ coordination costs. It can be argued that
3 Eckel and Egger (2012) do not account for this actual coordination mechanism operating in the above
mentioned European Industry Federations.
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the MNE may also incur transaction costs to coordinate wage negotiations among its
subsidiaries. However, throughout the paper, the underlying assumption is that coordi-
nation for the MNE is not costly. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, to access, recover,
gather, process and to share the relevant information needed during bargaining (e.g.,
the structure of labor costs) is easier for the management of the MNE than for union
delegates. Secondly, the effects of coordination costs on the MNE’s profits may be
realistically assumed to be negligible or, at least, to be lower than their effects on the
unions’ budgets.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and derives the sub-game perfect bargaining regime arising in equilibrium, under both
simultaneous and sequential games. Finally, Sect. 3 draws some conclusions.
2 The model
This section develops a bargaining game model between plant level unions and a
multi-unit firm with production sites in different countries of an integrated market.4
There are two symmetric countries, denoted A and B. Every economy has two sectors, a
perfectly competitive and an imperfectly competitive sector. The perfectly competitive
sector acts as a numéraire, with the wage and price levels equal to one. A MNE which
has a plant in each country operates in the imperfectly competitive sector. The MNE
produces goods for the entire market with no direct substitutes: that is, no interactions
occur in the product market. There are some exogenous fixed costs G, large enough
so that neither the MNE sets up a new production facility, nor a potential entrant
enters the industry. The MNE faces a linear product demand schedule, and products
may eventually be exported between countries without extra transportation costs. The
two plants have identical technology, and labor is the sole factor of production, with
decreasing return to scale. Labor supply is large enough to avoid corner solutions. Any
labor required by, or freed up from the MNE is supplied or absorbed by the numéraire
sector. However, the MNE hires workers at each plant from a rent-maximizing labor
union: in this sector, workers are fully unionized.
The model considers different types of games to derive the patterns of bargain-
ing in the MNE. Firstly, it studies a game where, in the first-stage, the unions and
MNE simultaneously and independently decide whether to coordinate wage bargain-
ing among the different plants. Then, the analysis investigates two different games
where, in the first two stages, the players move sequentially. In the first game spec-
ification, unions are first-movers and decide whether to coordinate activities across
plants; then, in the second stage, the MNE chooses whether to conduct negotiations
by subsidiary management or general management. In the second sequential game,
the order of moves is inverted. First, the MNE selects whether to coordinate wage
bargaining among subsidiaries, while in the second stage the unions decide whether
to coordinate their activities across plants. The last two stages are common, inde-
pendent of the simultaneous or sequential choice of coordination of the players in
4 Alternatively, the model may be interpreted as a multi-unit firm having plants within a country and selling
the goods in the domestic market.
123
378 SERIEs (2013) 4:373–392
the first-stage(s) of the game. After the bargaining parties’ decisions, wage negotia-
tions take place. These are modelled by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The
wage setting occurs before the employment decisions. Thus, the MNE hires workers
according to its necessities (right-to-manage approach). Finally, given the bargained
wages, the MNE allocates production among its plants. Notice that, when wage rates
are determined at the plant level, it may theoretically occur that unions set different
wages. Without transaction costs in the product market, the MNE can shift production
to the less expensive plant, until wage rates are equalized. Nevertheless, since the
production function presents decreasing return to scale, the reallocation of productive
activities from the less to the more economical plant is a finite process before the non-
negativity constraint is binding. Thus, wage competition is less intensive with respect
to the setting characterized by a constant return to scale technology Borghijs and Du
Caju (1999). The majority of the received literature has investigated the patterns of
bargaining in the presence of constant return to scale. However, in this model, with the
assumptions of an integrated market, linear demand, monopoly unions, and absence
of transportation costs, an infinitesimal difference in wage rates is sufficient to shift
the entire production towards the less expensive plant; thus, a decreasing return to
scale technology seems to be a more realistic assumption. Summarizing, the model
investigates a three-stage game in the case of simultaneous decisions and a four-stage
game in the case of sequential decisions about coordination activities. The model is
solved by backward induction, and the solution concept adopted is that of the sub-game
perfect equilibria.
In each plant, the production function (qi ) presents decreasing return to scale in the
single input, labor (li ),
qi =
√
li , i = A, B, (1)
while the (inverse) linear product demand function is
p = a − Q, (2)
where p is the common price for the integrated market, and Q = ∑i qi is total output.
The following Stone-Geary function describes the union utility
i = (wi − w0)li , i = A, B. (3)
Each union assigns equivalent weight to the wage and employment in its preferences
(neutrally oriented union). Positive utility derives from the fact that wages wi lie above
the reservation wage w0, or what workers receive if they are not employed by the MNE.
In the present model,w0 is the wage in the numéraire sector which, by definition, is
equal to one.5
5 The use of any other reservation wage w0 > 0 scales up (down) the bargained wage and, therefore,
the values of the union utilities and firm profits, while maintaining unchanged the qualitative results of the
model.
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2.1 Last stage: optimal allocation of production among MNE’s plants
The MNE maximizes profits by choosing the total quantity for the integrated market.
The two plants’ respective costs determine the optimal allocation between them. From
(1), given wages, total and marginal costs at each plant are T Ci = wi q2i and MCi =
2wi qi , respectively. It follows that the global marginal cost for the MNE is
MC = 2wiw j
wi + w j Q.
Total and marginal revenue are T R = (a − Q)Q and M R = a − 2Q. Standard opti-
mization techniques (see Borghijs and Du Caju 1999) yield the following productive
allocation at each plant
qi (wi , w j ) = aw j
2(wiw j + wi + w j ) , i, j = A, B; i = j. (4)
Thus, the labor demands are
li (wi , w j ) =
[
aw j
2(wiw j + wi + w j )
]2
i, j = A, B; i = j, (5)
with ∂qi/∂wi < 0, ∂li/∂wi < 0, ∂qi/∂w j > 0 and ∂li/∂w j > 0, that is, output and
employment in each plant are negatively dependent on the plant’s wage rate and
positively related to the wage rate in the other plant. This means that plant workers are
in competition with each other in the labor market. Notice also that qi /q j = w j/wi : the
necessary condition of equalization of the marginal costs of production across plants
is satisfied. Given global production, total cost is minimized and, hence, the MNE
maximizes profits. Finally, subsidiary i’s profits can be written as πi = pqi − wi li .




4(wi + w j + wiw j )
]
,
with ∂πi/∂wi < 0 and ∂πi/∂w j > 0, as expected: an increase in subsidiary i’s
bargained wage decreases its profits, while an increase in subsidiary j’s wage increases
subsidiary i’s profits.
2.2 Second-to-last stage: bargaining outcomes
This subsection reports on all possible bargaining outcomes, according to the strate-
gic choice of the negotiating parties (unions and MNE subsidiaries) regarding the
coordination/lack of coordination of their activities. In the following, this notation
is adopted: N stands for no coordination, C for coordination; the first letter refers
to unions, the second to the MNE. Therefore, four different bargaining regimes may
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occur: both parties do not coordinate their activities, that is, full decentralization (NN
regime, i.e. plant level negotiations); MNE general management coordination (NC
regime, i.e. headquarter agents of the MNE bargain separately and simultaneously
with the two unions); union coordination (CN regime, i.e. the delegates of the “Euro-
pean” union coordinate their activities and bargain separately and simultaneously with
the management of the two subsidiaries of the MNE); full centralization (CC regime,
i.e. two-union/general management level negotiations). With the obtained results, the
bargaining patterns in equilibrium are then derived.
2.2.1 Full decentralization
Suppose that neither the MNE nor the unions choose to coordinate their activities.
That is, negotiations at the MNE take place between subsidiaries’ management and
the respective plant level unions. Under the NN regime, maximization of the following
Nash Product determines the wage rate at each subsidiary
wi = arg max
wi
{
N Pi = (i )α(πi )1−α
}
i = A, B (6)
where α ∈ (0; 1) is the exogenous relative bargaining power of the unions, assumed to
be symmetric across plants. In case of breakdown of negotiations, the outside option
of both parties equals zero. Similarly, to Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b), each MNE’s
subsidiary is in a bilateral monopoly relation with the local labor union. Thus, the
wage rate at subsidiary j affects union i’s objective function only due to its indirect












i = A, B. (7)
Given symmetry, the equilibrium wage under NN is
wN N = 1 +
[√
α2 + α + 1 − (1 − α)
]
. (8)
The term in brackets represents the rent over the reservation wage. As expected,
∂wN N /∂α > 0: higher bargaining power of the union increases the equilibrium wage:
unions capture a higher share of the MNE’s rents. Substituting (8) into (5), the labor




2(2 + α + √α2 + α + 1)
]2
, (9)
with ∂li,N N /∂α < 0. Further substitutions into the relevant expressions allow compu-
tation of the MNE’s profits and global union utility, reported in Table 1.
123































































































































































































































































































































382 SERIEs (2013) 4:373–392
2.2.2 MNE subsidiaries’ coordination in bargaining
Assume now that the MNE negotiates with the headquarters representatives. One may
imagine a situation where the MNE sends one agent representing the total interests of
the firm to each subsidiary Zhao (1995). Since the cost of sending the headquarters
agents may be realistically supposed negligible with respect to the total profit amount,
the assumption that the MNE does not sustain any costs to coordinate bargaining
activities applies. Negotiations occur separately but simultaneously at each plant. In
such a regime, maximization of the following expression leads to the wage rate for
the i th subsidiary
wi = arg max
wi
{
N Pi = (i )α(πi + π j − π∗j )1−α
}
i, j = A, B; i = j, (10)
where π∗j is the MNE’s outside option in case of failure of the negotiations. Union i’s
outside option is equal to zero. In the present context, the MNE’s disagreement profits
(alternatively seen as lock-out funds) may be defined as π∗j =
[
a2w∗i
4(w∗i w j +w∗i +w j )
]
,
where w∗i is the equilibrium wages of this regime charged to subsidiaries i . That is,
the headquarters agent at the subsidiary iassumes that, during the negotiations at the
plant j , the agent in j takes for granted that an agreement is reached at the plant i on














i, j = A, B; i = j, (11)
because, in equilibrium, w∗i = w∗j and, therefore, π j =
[
a2w∗i
4(w∗i w∗j +w∗i +w∗j )
]
= π∗j .
Given the symmetry assumption, equilibrium wages are
wNC = 1 +
[√




where the term in brackets is the rent over the reservation wage, with ∂wNC/∂α > 0.
Nevertheless, from comparison of Eqs. (8) and (12), it occurs that wNC > wN N ∀α ∈
(0; 1). The rationale for this result may be found by inspection of the first-order
conditions in Eqs. (7) and (11). In the NN regime, each subsidiary management takes
into account only the negative effect of the negotiated wage during bargaining on its
subsidiary profit (the term ∂πi/∂wi ). Additionally, in the NC bargaining regime the
MNE’s headquarters agents also internalize the positive effect of the wage increase on
the other subsidiary (the term ∂π j/∂wi ). In other words, the general management of
the MNE considers the aggregate profits of both plants when bargaining with the union
of plant i , whereas decentralized bargaining at plant level implies that each subsidiary
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takes into account only its own profits. This implies that subsidiary i’s position is
weaker during negotiations while, through the recognition of this internalization effect
by MNE headquarters agents, the bargaining position of each union at the respective
plant improves. As a consequence, the negotiated wages are higher than in the NN case:
the MNE will accept payment of higher wages than in the case of decentralization.





5 + α + √α2 + 10α + 1
)2
, (13)
with ∂li,NC/∂α < 0. By comparison with Eqs. (9) and (13), it results that li,N N >
li,NC ∀α ∈ (0; 1): higher bargained wages in the NC regime reduce the labor demand
at each site for the MNE. Finally, after subsequent substitutions, the MNE profits and
global union utility are obtained, reported in Table 1.
2.2.3 Union coordination in bargaining
Assume now that the MNE decides to participate in negotiations with subsidiary man-
agement while unions coordinate their bargaining activities, i.e. through negotiations
conducted by delegates of the European Industry Federations unions. Bargaining takes
place independently but simultaneously at each subsidiary. By assumption, unions sus-
tain an exogenous per member (symmetric) transaction cost τ ≥ 0 for the coordination
of activities. The total amount of this cost, τ li , has to be deducted from the union’s
rent in the case of separate bargaining (Borghijs and Du Caju 1999). A reduction in
unions’ transaction costs is the measure of the degree of labor market integration. In
the CN bargaining regime, the following Nash product’s maximization determines the
wage for the i th subsidiary









i, j = A, B; i = j (14)
where D∗j is the outside option of the industry unions’ federation. MNE subsidiary i’s
outside option in the absence of coordination equals zero. The disagreement util-
ity of the unions’ federation may have different specifications (Horn and Wolin-
sky 1988a,b; Dobson 1994; Santoni 2009; Mukherjee 2010). In the present context,




2(w∗i w j +w∗i +w j )
]2
(alternatively seen as the utility flows during temporary nego-
tiations breakdown), where w∗i is the equilibrium wages of this regime charged to
subsidiaries i . Similarly to the previous case, the delegate of the unions’ federation in
i assumes that, during negotiations at the plant j , the delegate in j takes it for granted
that an agreement is reached at the plant i at the equilibrium wage.
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(wi − τ − 1) + ∂l j
∂wi
(w j − τ − 1)
]






because, in equilibrium, w∗i = w∗j ; therefore, (w j − τ − 1)l j = (w∗j − τ − 1)[
aw∗i
2(w∗i w∗j +w∗i +w∗j )
]2
= D∗j . Comparison of (7) and (15) shows that the difference
between uncoordinated/coordinated unions lies in the fact that, in the latter case, they
consider both the effect of wi on li and the impact of their own wage on the labor
demand at the other plant. In other words, unions internalize the cross effects of an
increase in their wage rates on overall employment levels (Davidson 1988; Horn and
Wolinsky 1988a,b). Since in the present context workers at each plant are perfect sub-
stitutes in production activity, an increase in subsidiary i’s wage rate raises the labor
demand at subsidiary j(and vice versa): that is, ∂l j/∂wi > 0. Hence, the bargaining
coordination across plants for labor unions should in principle be more profitable than
uncoordinated bargaining. Nevertheless, the presence of transaction costs may offset
the unions’ gains. Whether coordination is beneficial for unions depends crucially on
the size of these costs.
Given the symmetry, from (15) equilibrium wages are
wC N = 1 +
{[√
(4 + τ)α2 + 2(τ 2 + 2τ − 2)α + (τ + 2)2
2
]





The term in brackets represents the union rent. Analytical inspection reveals that
∂wC N /∂α > 0, as expected, and ∂wC N /∂τ > 0: an increase in transaction costs for
coordinating activities is shifted on higher wage demands by unions. Placing the wage




(4 + τ)(α + 1) + √(4 + τ)α2 + 2(τ 2 + 2τ − 2)α + (τ + 2)2
]2
(17)
with ∂li,C N /∂α < 0 and ∂li,C N /∂τ < 0. This is so because both higher unions’ relative
bargaining power and transaction costs increase the bargained wage, and this, in turn,
implies a reduction in the labor demand at each site for the MNE (the wage/employment
trade-off). Subsequent substitutions lead to the expressions for the MNE profits and
global union utility reported in Table 1.
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2.2.4 Full coordination
Finally, suppose that both the MNE and the labor unions choose to conduct negotiations
by coordinating their bargaining activities. Negotiations take place independently and
simultaneously at the two MNE subsidiaries (the CC case in Fig. 1). As before, labor
unions incur exogenous per member coordination costs while the MNE does not. In
the CC bargaining regime, the maximization of the following Nash product determines
the wage rate for the i th subsidiary





(wi − τ − 1)li + (w j − τ − 1)l j
]α
(πi + π j )1−α
}
i, j = A, B; i = j. (18)
In the case of a breakdown in negotiations, the two parties’ outside option now equals
zero.6 For i, j = A, B; i = j , the first-order condition for wage maximization is




(wi − τ − 1) + ∂l j
∂wi
(w j − τ − 1)
]









Given the symmetry, in equilibrium the wage rates are
wCC = 1 + [(3α + τ(1 + α)] (20)
where the term in brackets is the union rent over reservation wage, with ∂wCC/∂α > 0
and ∂wCC/∂τ > 0. Substituting the wage rate in (20) back into (5), the labor demand




2[(3 + τ)(1 + α)]
]2
(21)
with ∂li,CC/∂α < 0 and ∂li,CC/∂τ < 0. By comparison to Eqs. (16) and (20), and
Eqs. (17) and (21), it results that wC N ≥ wCC and li,CC ≥ li,C N if and only if
transaction costs are above a certain threshold level, namely τ ≥ τ ∗, with τ ∗ =√
4α2+5α+1
α+1 −1. In such a case, the MNE, through implemented coordination, recovers
its bargaining position when it opposes coordinated unions. This is so because the MNE
reduces unions’ outside option from D∗j to zero. This coordination effect overcomes
6 While for the MNE the assumption that the outside option is equal to zero is normal (the management may
stop the production at every plant), for unions this is less obvious. However, in the last 15 years, European
unions have been able to stop production three times in plants sited in different countries. The first time was
in 1997, after that Renault announced to close the assembly plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium (EIROnline 1997).
The second case was the “Euro-strike” at the General Motors; unions of the EMF, in June 2006, paralyzed
the production simultaneously at several plants (EIROnline 2006). The third case was the European strike
organized in December 2011 by the EMF at the ArcelorMittal; unions, in that occasion, were able to block
production in many production sites (Reuters 2011).
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both the cross effects of employment and the internalization of profit externalities
(see Eqs. (19), (15) and (11)), which leads to lower negotiated wages and higher
employment levels. On the contrary, if τ < τ ∗, it follows that wCC > wC N and li,C N >
li,CC : despite unions’ outside option is falling to zero, the coordination advantages
for the MNE are not sufficient to dominate the internalization of employment and
profit externalities. Thus, full coordination leads to negotiated wages higher than in
the presence of union coordination alone. This finding partially reverses the MNE’s
position with respect to the case of uncoordinated unions. In that situation, the MNE has
no incentives in conducing wage negotiations with the headquarters agents, since the
internalization of subsidiary profit externalities puts the unions in a stronger position.
Finally, further substitutions allow for the evaluation of the expressions for the MNE
profits and global union utility, as reported in Table 1.7
2.3 First stage(s): strategic choices and sub-game equilibrium bargaining patterns
This subsection investigates the coordination choice of the parties given the bargaining
outcomes. Firstly, the focus is on the simultaneous game; then, the model analyzes the
sequential game where the MNE is the first mover.
2.3.1 Simultaneous moves game
Let us at first consider the bargaining patterns arising as equilibrium of the game within
the MNE by analysing the simultaneous moves game, where the parties select their
coordination strategy at the same time, each unaware of the other party’s strategic
choice. In this case, the game as a whole is a three-stage game. The MNE and the
unions decide whether to coordinate negotiations by comparing global profits and
utility levels attained. The bargaining power of the parties, α, and the unions’ per
member fees, τ , affect the relative outcomes.
Proposition 1 Under the simultaneous move game, not to coordinate bargaining is the
dominant strategy for the MNE. If transaction costs are low, unions find it advantageous
to coordinate negotiations whatever their relative bargaining power. Nevertheless,
there is a threshold value of coordination costs τ ∗∗(α) such that, for τ ≤ τ ∗∗ , a CN
regime emerges in equilibrium while, for τ ≤ τ ∗∗, a NN regime arises.
By using the results in Table 1, it is directly obtained that πC N > πCC and πN N >
πNC ∀α ∈ (0, 1)∧ τ ∈ (0,∞): independently of the unions’ strategic choice, not to
coordinate bargaining activities is the dominant strategy for the MNE. The rational is
that the headquarters agents internalize subsidiaries’ profits and, therefore, take into
account the aggregate profits of the company during negotiations, putting unions in a
stronger bargaining position. Hence, the general management of the MNE may agree
7 It should be noted that, in the present context, negotiated wages do not depend on the parameter a in the
demand function in Eq. (2), interpreted as a measure of the market size, but only employment levels. This is
due to the assumption of a convex production function technology. This result differs from the standard one
obtained with constant returns where the market size parameter affects the firms’ output and, subsequently,
unions’ wage demands.
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Fig. 1 simultaneous moves
game, Nash equilibria
to pay higher wages, whereas decentralized bargaining implies that each subsidiary
management considers only plant profits.
Given that the MNE always plays N , the unions’ best response is to play the
strategy N if N N > C N . This occurs when τ > τ ∗∗(α) (whose expression is not
reported due to analytical complexity), with limα→0 τ ∗∗ = 1.02. Here, unions do not
coordinate: full decentralization arises as the bargaining regime in equilibrium. That
is, if unions have sufficiently strong bargaining power, the presence of high transaction
costs more than offset the gains from coordination.
On the other hand, when τ ≤ τ ∗∗(α), it follows that C N ≥ N N , and the unions’
best response is to coordinate negotiations. Thus, the combination of the parameters
is such that unions’ partial centralization arises in equilibrium. The threshold value
τ ∗∗ depends on the parties’ bargaining power, with ∂τ ∗∗/∂α < 0: high levels of
unions’ bargaining power decrease the threshold for coordination. If per member fees
are not too high, namely τ ∗∗ |α=1 = 0.232 , unions find it advantageous to coordinate
negotiations whatever their relative bargaining power. However, when unions are weak
(low α), their coordination incentives are high. Hence, unions’ partial centralization
is the equilibrium of the game also in the presence of comparatively high transaction
costs. These analytical results are graphically summarized in Fig. 1, which depicts the
two areas representing the Nash equilibria of the game in the (α, τ )-plane.
2.3.2 Sequential move game
Let us focus now on the sequential move game, where one of the bargaining parties
has knowledge about the strategic decision of the other party. In this model, in the first
stage the MNE decides whether to coordinate wage bargaining between plants. Then,
in the second stage, unions decide whether to coordinate negotiations.
Second stage: unions’ choice of coordinated vs. not coordinated bargaining
In the second stage, unions choose whether to coordinate bargaining. This decision
depends on the level of the global utility (that is, the sum of the utilities) the two unions
receive under the choice of the MNE as regards the conduct of negotiations. Unions’
global utility is, in turn, affected by the relative bargaining power and per member
coordination fees.
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Coordination in bargaining among unions is advantageous if C N ≥ N N when
the MNE does not coordinate, and if CC ≥ NC when the MNE negotiates with
headquarter agents. Previous direct comparisons of the unions’ payoffs have shown
that, if the MNE does not coordinate negotiations, N N ≥ C N if τ > τ ∗∗(α), and
C N > N N if τ ≤ τ ∗∗(α). On the other hand, if the MNE coordinates bargaining,
unions’ coordination outcome dominates independent plant level negotiations when
the transaction costs are lower than (equal to) the threshold value
τ ∗∗∗(α) ≤ −2α[(α
2 + 2α − 3)√α2 + 10α + 1 − 5α + 7α2 + α3 − 15]
(α + 1)2[(α + 3)√α2 + 10α + 1 + 8α + α2 + 3] ,
with τ ∗∗∗ |α=0 = 0 and τ ∗∗∗ |α=1 = 0.232 , while NC ≥ CC if τ > τ ∗∗∗(α).
Further analytical inspection reveals the following results. Firstly, unions coordinate
negotiations to improve their position vis-à-vis the MNE when transaction fees are
not too costly, irrespective of their degree of relative bargaining power. Secondly,
an inverse U-shaped relation (with the maximum reached at the value of α = 1/3)
between transaction costs and unions’ bargaining power exists: weak and strong unions
are better off with independent plant level negotiations. If unions are extremely weak,
small amounts of per member fees are sufficient to generate costs high enough to
offset the benefits of coordination. On the other hand, if unions are strong, they prefer
independent negotiations because the gains from internalization (the cross effects of
wage increase on total employment) are not sufficient to counterbalance the cost of
coordination.
First stage: the MNE’s decision and sub-game equilibriums
In the first stage of the game, the MNE chooses whether to negotiate with the
headquarters agents. To select its bargaining strategy, the MNE evaluates the profits
associated to every regime and takes into account the unions’ strategic choices about
coordination. The following analysis shows how the unions’ strategic decisions affect
the MNE’s choice, and derives the sub-game perfect bargaining regime in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under the sequential move game, for low values of coordination costs,
namely τ ≤ τ ∗∗∗ , a CN regime emerges in equilibrium for every unions’ bargaining
power. If τ ≤ τ ∗∗∗ , unions do not coordinate and, for τ ≤ τ ∗∗ , a NC regime emerges
in equilibrium while, for τ ≤ τ ∗∗ , a NN regime arises.
If the MNE does not coordinate bargaining activities, unions will select the strategy
C for τ ≤ τ ∗∗ while, for τ > τ ∗∗, they will play the strategy N . The rationale has
been found in the analysis of the simultaneous game: when τ ≤ τ ∗∗ and unions
do not have strong bargaining power, coordination gains more than offset the costs,
while the reverse holds true if τ > τ ∗∗. Instead, if the MNE coordinates, unions will
play C if τ ≤ τ ∗∗∗. This is because low transaction costs make coordination worthy
for unions whatever is their bargaining power. On the other hand, for τ > τ ∗∗∗, they
negotiate independently at plant level. These outcomes generate three different regions
in the(α, τ )-plane, as Fig. 2 shows.
The first region is defined by the set of points τ = 0 and τ ≤ τ ∗∗∗(α). In this
region, the unions coordinate wage negotiations irrespective of whether the MNE
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:373–392 389
Fig. 2 Sequential game, MNE
first-mover. Bargaining regimes
in equilibrium
coordinates. Therefore, the MNE compares πC N and πCC . As previously seen,
for τ < τ ∗∗∗, πC N > πCC : the MNE does not negotiate with the headquarter
agents. Thus, the CN regime arises in equilibrium. The set of points (τ ∈ (α =
0) |0 ≤ τ < 1.02 ) ∪ τ ∗∗∗(α) < τ ≤ τ ∗∗(α) delineates the second region. In this
area, if the MNE coordinates with the headquarters agents, the unions will negotiate
separately at each plant, while if the MNE does not coordinate, unions will negotiate
wages with industry delegates. Thus, the MNE evaluates πNC and πC N . Direct com-
parison of payoffs shows that πNC > πC N , and, therefore, the NC regime arises as
equilibrium of the game. Finally, the part of the (α, τ )-plane delimited by the set of
points (τ ∈ (α = 0) |1.02 < τ ) ∪ τ ∗∗(α) < τ characterizes the third region. At these
levels of transaction fees, unions’ gains from coordination are cancelled out. Thus,
unions bargain independently at each plant, no matter what is the MNE’s choice. The
MNE selects its strategy by comparing πNC and πN N . Since, in this region, the profits
for the MNE are such that πN N > πNC , full decentralization, the NN regime, arises
in equilibrium. The results differ from those of Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2002) due
to the absence of transaction costs and the equal bargaining power between the bar-
gaining parties in wage negotiations. Moreover, the general framework presented in
this work, by taking into account the cross and coordination effects of negotiations,
determines a broader set of bargaining structures in equilibrium than those in Borghijs
and Du Caju (1999).
To summarize, the analysis in the previous subsections has shown that, in the pres-
ence of strong unions and high coordination costs, the bargaining pattern is identical for
both structures of the game: full decentralization arises in equilibrium. The difference
between the two game structures arises in the presence of relatively low coordination
fees. On the one hand, in the simultaneous game, firm partial coordination is the other
possible regime in equilibrium. On the other hand, in the sequential game, in the pres-
ence of sufficiently low union transaction costs and for every level of their relative
bargaining power, also unions partial coordination arises in equilibrium. Therefore,
the bargaining regimes in equilibrium are sensitive to the hypothesis regarding the
timing of the game.
2.3.3 Extensions of the model
Many of the qualitative results of the model are also valid under different specifications.
Nonetheless, some specificities appear.
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Firstly, it can be easily checked that the change in the order of moves (unions
as first-movers) in the model described above leads to the identical outcome of the
simultaneous moves game.
Secondly, different specifications of the bargaining parties’ outside options have
been also tested. To evaluate the potential benefits of union coordination, it has been
considered the more favorable bargaining position for the MNE during wage negoti-
ations. Therefore, the outside options in the Nash product have been set equal to zero
for unions and the monopoly production with a unique plant serving the whole market
for the MNE. It has been found that: (1) the bargaining outcomes of the NN and NC
regimes are the same; and (2) the CC and CN regimes are equivalent as well. As a
result, the MNE chooses to coordinate bargaining, irrespective of the unions’ choice,
if πC ≥ πN . Similarly, the unions choose to coordinate their bargaining activities,
irrespective of the MNE choice, if C ≥ N . This different model design has led to
the following results. In the simultaneous move game, the organization of the wage
bargaining predominantly occurs with decentralized unions in equilibrium, while the
MNE is indifferent whether to coordinate wage negotiations. However, for low levels
of the transaction costs, there are two areas where a Nash equilibrium does not exist.
On the other hand, in the sequential move games with the MNE as first-mover, the
bargaining regimes with unions’ decentralization are still predominant, but for low
levels of transaction costs and high unions’ bargaining power, unions’ coordination
arises in equilibrium, while the MNE is still indifferent to its organization of wage
negotiations.8
Finally, Buccella (2013) investigates the effects of fixed transaction costs for unions.
The main findings are as follows. If the firm acts as the first-mover, an inverse
U-shaped relation between fixed coordination costs and unions’ bargaining power
exists. For low and high union bargaining strength, relatively small transaction costs
make coordination not advantageous, while coordinated activities turn out to be bene-
ficial for intermediate values. The multi-plant firm generally prefers not to coordinate
wage negotiations. Hence, the predominant bargaining regimes are NN and CN. How-
ever, if the unions are strong enough and the fixed transaction costs are not very low,
there is an area where the NC regime arises in equilibrium. On the other hand, if
the simultaneous moves and the sequential game with unions as the first movers are
investigated, similar patterns of bargaining arise, with the only difference that the NC
regime is no longer an equilibrium of the game.
3 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the patterns of bargaining which arise in equilibrium
between a MNE and plant-level unionized workforce in the presence of unions’ coor-
dination costs (per member fees). In the first stages of the game, the bargaining parties
decide whether to coordinate wage negotiations. Two different timings of the game
have been considered: simultaneous moves and sequential move games, where the
MNE acts as the first-mover player. Regardless of the specifications of the first stages
8 Analytical details may be provided from the author upon request.
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of the game, the final stages are common: after the bargaining parties have chosen
their coordination strategies, wage negotiations take place; then, given the bargained
wages, the MNE determines the optimal allocation of production among plants. The
main points of the paper are the following. Different bargaining regimes arise as sub-
game perfect equilibria in the presence of workers’ perfect substitutes in production,
absence of asymmetries among the MNE’s plants and labor unions paying transaction
costs to coordinate their activities at transnational level. Depending on the amount
of unions’ costs and the relative bargaining power of the parties, partial coordination
(unions or MNE’s subsidiaries coordination only) and full decentralization emerge
as bargaining regimes in equilibrium. Hence, coordination in wage bargaining is not
always beneficial for unions: high transaction costs more than offset coordination
gains. This, in part, moderates the conflict of interests between the MNE and labor
unions over the level of coordination during negotiations. However, the bargaining
regimes in equilibrium are sensitive to the timing of the game.
The proposed model may help to clarify the variety of bargaining coordination
activities observed within the MNE operating in the EU. The fact that unions’ transna-
tional bargaining activities have recently been increasing may indicate that coordi-
nation costs are decreasing (labor markets become better integrated) and, at least in
those companies with plants located in the countries with similar labor productivity,
these practices are more likely to occur. Further developments in the EU legislation
regarding information and consultation rights for MNE employees may push unions
towards coordination of bargaining activities at company level. However, the results
of this work are restricted to the case of a MNE in the monopoly position. A more real-
istic framework should consider an international oligopoly market structure, through
the analysis of the effects of firms’ strategic interactions on the unions’/MNE’s coor-
dination choices in bargaining activities. Additionally, differences in labor unions’
transaction costs across companies and labor productivity among plants may affect
the pattern of the bargaining. That is, coordination activities which take place in one
company will not necessarily appear in another. These are extensions of the model
which may help to understand the effects of the EU interventions on company-level
bargaining institutions.
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